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The Kosovo Problem -- A Case for Partition
When trying to explain and solve a long standing ethno-national conflict, there is often a fear of oversimplification of deeply rooted complicated issues. Multilayered conflicts demand a cautious approach from both policy makers and the academic community when it comes to explaining the roots of a conflict and giving a prescription for its solving. The Kosovo problem is one such conflict. The intricacy of myth, historical and ethnic nationalism and rights, and perpetual struggle between territorial integrity and the right to self determination make this problem really hard to understand and especially interesting for academic research.
Nationalism as the Root of the Conflict
The Kosovo conflict has its root causes in the clash of two distinct types of nationalism. The first is the Albanian both separate and emancipatory nationalism.
The separate nationalism is associated with the long-lasting goal of Kosovar Albanians to secede from Serbia. For Hobsbawm, this type of nationalism is characteristic of post-communist multinational/ federal states. In both of the multinational “real socialist” societies, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, it was officially claimed that the national question was successfully solved. It turned out that it was not. Old national conflicts appeared, at least temporarily, unresolved. Under the conditions of accelerated material growth and progressively improving standards of living, they assumed a latent form. They flared up soon after those societies had entered a period of serious economic and political crisis (Tragedy of National Conflicts in "Real Socialism." The Case of Kosovo., by Mihailo Markovic, 1989). The rationale is that after democratic changes in communist federations, the formation of separate nationalism occurs in federal units when these units are based on national identities. This was a major explanation of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the USSR.
However, we cannot neglect the earlier history of Albanian nationalism, which starts at the end of the 19th century with the formation of national states in the Balkans. This nationalism was emancipatory, in terms of freeing oneself from the Ottoman Empire, and from Serbia respectively.
On the other hand, Serbian nationalism is historic and cultural, deeply rooted in what Kosovo means to Serbs, as part of their culture, identity and religion. Kosovo is also an important part of Serbian nation building. Historically, in the 19th and 20th centuries, in Serbian national consciousness, the Serbian state is not complete without Kosovo.
The clash of these two nationalisms is driven by both nations’ claiming rights to the same territory. That leads to the creation of an inter-ethnic conflict. Pavlovic states that these conflicts are characterized by: one, high emotions and high level of passion among both sides; two, both sides are ready to sacrifice economic and individual interests (sometimes even life) if national identity is at stake; three, the actors in the conflict are not ready to compromise; four, these conflicts are exclusionary and with a low level of tolerance; five, they are characterized by the fear of the negative other, and in that state of fear resides social energy that can explode at any moment; six, those who are neutral in the conflict are under the pressure of losing their individuality and comply with the group interest, “if you are not with us, then you are against us;” seven, it is really easy for these conflicts to get out of control; eight, there is a powerful role of speech and symbols in inter-ethnic conflicts (Multiculturalism and Etnification of Politics, by Vukasin Pavlovic, 1996). When faced with all these characteristics of a multi-ethnic conflict, it can be a Sisyphus job to find a solution to them. A solution that can satisfy both sides is practically almost impossible, but one that will do more good than harm can be achieved. Kosovo’s unilateral proclamation of independence on February 17, 2008 is obviously not the one that will create stability in the region or lay the foundation for constructive inter-ethnic relations.
The Unilateral Proclamation of Independence. The International Community vs. Serbia’s Stance.
The unilateral proclamation of independence came after two years of mediated negotiations between the government of Serbia and the provisional self-governing institutions of Kosovo, which had been under the international protection of the UN since the Kosovo War ended in 1999. The two years of negotiations did not bring an agreement between the divided sides, their arguments having been based on two irreconcilable principles: one is the right to self-determination, the other is the respect of territorial integrity and international law.
The Albanians claimed that they had a right to self-determination, which implied secession from Serbia, based not only on the suffering under the Serbian government of the 1990s (Just Cause Theory), but also on the ground that a territorially concentrated majority has a right to secede if it expresses a desire to do so (Choice theory). This thesis has clearly been backed by major international community players, such as the United States and the most important European Union countries. The dilemma about the status of Kosovo that the international community was faced with was great: how to bring stability to the region and respect the Albanian and Serbian points of view at the same time. It was important to provide for a solution that was not a zero-sum, where one side gets all while the other gets nothing.
The international community felt that they needed to respect the fact that Kosovar Albanians were persecuted during the Milosevic era in Serbia, which was the reason for international intervention in 1999. The argument of the countries that have recognized Kosovo is based on the idea that Kosovo is a unique case in international relations because of the civil war, humanitarian intervention and international administration that have been prevailing in Kosovo for a number of years. They have also argued that Serbia showed under Milosevic that it could not administrate Kosovo and that any return of Kosovo to Serbian sovereignty would not be possible, because Kosovo had passed through a certain process of democratization and institutionalization during its period of international administrating. They have also stated that the supreme majority of displeased Albanians would not want anything else but independence and, therefore, it would be impossible not to recognize the wish of that big majority, having in mind that Albanians consist 90% of Kosovo’s population. On February 18, 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state and said that “recognition is the only viable option to promote stability in the region, and also rejected the notion advanced by Russia and others that Kosovo’s independence will spur other secessionist movements, saying it cannot be seen as a precedent elsewhere” (US Recognizes Kosovo, Reaffirms Friendship with Serbia, in Voice of America, by David Gollust, 18 February 2008).
On the other hand, it was also important for the international community to satisfy some of the Serbian arguments, especially because for the last eight years Serbia has been a democratic state governed by a pro-European government and determined to become a member of the EU in the future. Therefore, it was necessary to strike some balance in the proposal in order not to have Serbia going back to the pattern of nationalism. There was the great threat of “Serbian post-Trianon sindrom” based on the widespread belief of Serbian people of the unjustness of the international community toward Serbs, especially when it came to the Kosovo question (Serbian Exit Strategy for Kosovo, by Slobodan Markovic, 2007). That balance was seen in the respect of Serbian minority rights in Kosovo and the protection of Serbian cultural and historical heritage. Kosovo may not be totally independent, but the proposal suggests independence monitored by the European Union Mission (EULEX), whose job is to make sure that the rule of law and the respect of Serbian minority rights have been implemented (Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, by Martti Ahtisaari, 27 March 2007).
The Serbian government took the normative stand of territorial integrity and sovereignty based on international law, the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and UN Resolution 1244, which ended the Kosovo War, and established an international protectorate. The UNSC resolution 1244 reaffirms the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia. Serbia has questioned the arguments of the international community that the Kosovo case was unique. There were many other similar cases of secession around the world and Kosovo was not an exception. At the same time, independence has been seen as a punishment for democratic Serbia which has been dealing slowly with its nationalistic past. If the reason for international intervention in Serbia in 1999 were human rights, why is the international community rewarding Kosovar Albanians with independence even though they have expelled 200,000 Serbs from Kosovo since 1999 and the Serbs remaining south of the Ibar River have been living in enclaves with constrained freedom of movement. Also, what is the rationale behind two Albanian states in Europe? For Serbia, Kosovo’s proclamation of independence, supported by the international community, was actually a zero-sum solution.
Serbia has contested the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo by diplomatic means. Serbia has stated that it would never recognize Kosovo as an independent state (the preamble of the Serbian Constitution states that Kosovo is a part of Serbia; the presidential and parliamentary oaths of office include words of defending Kosovo as a part of Serbia) and that all countries that recognize Kosovo were violating international law, and has also raised questions in the International Court of Justice about the legality of Kosovo’s proclamation of independence. Serbia has Russia as a powerful ally in the UN as well. Russia has contested Kosovo’s independence and stated that it would never accept Kosovo as a member of the UN, having in mind its position as a permanent member of the Security Council who has a veto right for acceptance of new members and gives recommendations to the General Assembly for new members (UN Charter, Section 2, Article 4). A lot of countries are afraid to recognize the independence of Kosovo because they are facing similar problems of minority secession. The failure of Kosovo and its allies to arguably persuade other countries to recognize Kosovo’s independence shows us that the international norm of sovereignty and territorial integrity is still important in the international community.
Did the Unilateral Proclamation of Independence Bring Stability?
There are some serious flaws regarding the unilateral proclamation of independence and the prospects for stable and functional relations not only between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, but also between Serbia and Kosovo as independent states.
The situation in Kosovo is far from rosy. Historically, its two communities have not been living together, but one beside the other. The ethnic cleansing of Albanians during the Kosovo war and the ethnic cleansing of Serbs after the war created perpetual fear between the two communities (fear of the negative other). This led to the establishment of two parallel societies. The Albanians, who felt victorious after the war, organized their life respecting the institutions of the provisional self-governance while the Serbs, concentrated in ethnic enclaves in central Kosovo and north of the Ibar River, followed the instructions of the government of Serbia, relied completely on its help for survival, and mostly boycotted the provisional institutions. In particular, the Serbian enclave north of the Ibar River is completely independent from the Kosovar central government and does not have any mutual points of recognition. The unilateral proclamation of independence just cemented this existing parallelism. Even though the international mediators’ plan for Kosovo guaranteed the Serbian community in Kosovo various minority rights such as high decentralization, positive discrimination when it comes to political representation in the parliament, representation in the central government, cultural and educational rights, and special connections with the Serbian government, the Serbian community, supported by the government in Belgrade, refused this plan. The internal status quo of the parallel life of the two communities has remained intact even though Kosovo’s external status has changed to a considerable extent.
According to Chapman and Roeder, there are four different possible outcomes of ethnic civil wars, and those are: preserving unitarism, autonomy, de facto separation, and partition (Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions, in American Political Science Review, by Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, 2007). Some of these outcomes give more chances for stability after a conflict than others. Authors claim that, by their empirical analysis, the de facto separation and partition provide for more chances for peace preservation than the other two possible outcomes of autonomy and unitarism. It is obvious that Kosovo has produced something that Chapman and Roeder call de facto separations, which typically follow ceasefires or truces, establish few, if any, new institutional arrangements for governance, but leave the secessionists in effective control of their region and population and keep the central government out. However, we also have to have in mind that de facto separations are always only transitional agreements and, therefore, it is necessary to find a solution that is permanent.
Using their argument, the Ahtisaari Plan, which established some kind of an institutional arrangement that provides for a unitary state of Kosovo to be preserved, but also provides the minority Serbs with some kind of non-territorial autonomy, is clearly not functioning, considering the existing de facto separation and reemergence of low-level communal violence in the north.
The unilateral proclamation of independence not only did not solve Kosovo’s internal problems, but it also left Kosovo’s international status in limbo. One year after the proclamation of independence, only 56 states have recognized Kosovo. Even though most of these states are major actors on the international scene (the USA and most EU states), this is not a critical number of states yet for Kosovo to become an equal player in the international community. Kosovo is not a member of the UN, neither is it a member of any other international organization.
Kosovo will also be unrecognized by a number of its neighbors (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, and Serbia) and several major powers (China, India, and Russia), and will be unable to gain membership in numerous international organizations (notably, the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe because Russia has veto power in acceptance of new members). All of these problems will have an impact on Kosovo’s ability to grow its economy, improve a situation in which unemployment hovers at 50 percent (the majority of whom are under the age of thirty), or to attract foreign investors, who tend to avoid places where legal systems are weak, political risk is high, and infrastructure is in bad shape. Potential foreign investors will be deterred by the fact that Kosovo is in many ways a geographic backwater in the region. (The Regional and International Implications of Kosovo Independence, in Mediterranean Quarterly, by Gordon Bardos, 2008)
It is viable to say that the unilateral proclamation of independence only froze the conflict for some time without providing a good solution for constructive inter-ethnic and inter-state relations, which are of great importance for the economic and political stability of the region. If the political and economic situation in Kosovo remains similar to what it is now, i.e. high unemployment and low level of direct foreign investment, Kosovar Albanians can end up blaming Serbia and Kosovar Serbs for the shortfalls in the economic and political development because of the relative international isolation. At the same time, the Serbian goal for joining the European Union can be halted for a significant period of time because of the unresolved Kosovo problem and the Serbian unwillingness to recognize facts on the ground and to admit that Kosovo is lost. There is also the problem of possible spillover of instability into the region, especially into already shaky Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Partition that would go along the ethnic division in the north as a possible compromise solution to the Kosovo problem has to be taken into consideration by both communities as well as the international community if there is a willingness to create stable relations between the two communities and states.
Partition -- Definition, Justification and Critiques
Not many academics have theoretically analyzed partition. Even those who have have often equalized partition and secession. It is necessary to put a line of demarcation between the two political terms. Obviously, both terms involve some division of a territorial unit (state), but each has a slightly different outcome. For Brendan O’ Leary, political partition objectively divides a previously unified territorial entity into two or more parts, which may be marked with borders or codified in new maps (Analysing Partition: Definition, Classification and Explanation, by Brendan O’ Leary, 2006). The other, broader, definition also comes from O’Leary and states that political partition should be defined as a fresh border cut through at least one community’s national homeland, creating at least two separate political units under different sovereigns or authorities, and that the purpose of political partition is to regulate or resolve a national, ethnic or communal conflict (Debating Partition: Justification and Critiques, by Brendan O’ Leary, 2006). Obviously, for partition to happen, it is necessary to have some redrawing of borders, i.e. some new line of demarcation to emerge inside one political and territorial unit. Heraclides also gives a similar definition of partition, but from his point of view, it is necessary to have the redrawing of borders with the consent of both sides in order for partition to be legal under international law (Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics, by Alexis Heraclides, 1990).
Secession as a concept derives its existence from the right to self determination. For the question of self-determination, it is important to bear in mind who the people that can exercise the right are and what the relevant territorial unit in which they should exercise their self-determination is (Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession, in National Self-Determination and Secession, by Margaret Moore, 1998). There is a distinction between ethnic and civic right to self-determination. The ethnic conception gives an ethnic group residing in its ancestral territory the right to secede or to practice self-determination. The other, more viable, justification and explanation of secession is the civic conception, as used in international law, that “…secession is the right of the majority within an accepted political unit to exercise power” (Margaret Moore, 1998). This means that any division of a state, in order to be recognized as secession, has to happen along already existing borders so that an already existing territorial unit secedes from a central government.
Kosovo’s unilateral proclamation of independence in accordance with the Ahtisaari Plan was a case of secession because Kosovo has its own recognized administrative borders, so secession, even though not recognized by most members of the UN, happened along the already existing borders. Alexis Heraclides would argue that this is a case par excellence for secession, because for him, secession is a unilateral break up from a state which is illegal by international law (Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics, by Alexis Heraclides, 1990). The eventual secession of Kosovo’s Serbian enclaves in the north from Kosovo and their de jure reintegration into the Serbian political system would obviously be a case of partition, because the new border line would be drawn along the Ibar River, where the Serbian majority territory in North Kosovo ends geographically.
Justification
The justification of partition is based on the empirical work of academics who see partition as an arrangement that can regulate or resolve national and ethnic conflicts. The main point there is what the purpose of partition is. In general, the works of Kauffman, Thomas Chapman and Carter Johnson argue that partition can be a good way for solving really hard and long-lasting ethnic conflicts. The partition theory rests on two primary principles. Firstly, ethnic civil wars are qualitatively different from other kinds of civil war. Secondly, warring ethnic groups confront a security dilemma that prevents them from de-escalating and demobilizing. As a result, ethnic groups must be separated and given sovereignty to produce long-term peace (Partitioning to Peace-Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars, in International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, by Carter Johnson, 2008). For all these academics, partition facilitates post-war democratization, prevents war recurrence, and significantly reduces low-level ethnic violence. According to Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder,
(…) [P]artition emerges as a good solution for nationalist wars than the alternatives of unitarism, de facto separation, or autonomy insofar as it increases the prospects for postconflict peace and democracy. After 72 nationalist civil wars between 1945 and 2002, only 14% of the parties to de jure partition experienced a resumption of violence within 2 years, and sovereign states created by partition are no more likely to go to war against one another than states created by other means. Parties to partition were more likely to see a substantial rise in the level of democracy. After civil wars of nationalism, parties to partition all saw a rise in postconflict democracy from preconflict levels (measured as a positive change in their Polity scores) and for 71% this was a substantial rise of 6 or more on the 20-point scale. For parties to de facto separation, all saw a rise, but for only 20% was this rise substantial. For parties kept together in a unitary state, 37% saw a rise; but 35% saw a decline, and only 9% saw a substantial rise. And for the parties to autonomy arrangements, only 22% saw a rise, and 56% saw a decline in levels of democracy. States created by partition were more likely than other new states to be born democratic and to enjoy more years of postindependence democracy. (Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions, in American Political Science Review, by Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, 2007)
Brendan O’Leary, on the other hand, suggests that those who support partition often do that on the historicist ground of the “last resort” argument, where partition is justified when all other options have failed, then the “cost-benefit” argument, arguing that partition prevents the worst outcomes of war and suffering, and the “better tomorrow” argument, stating that post conflict partition would probably provide a better solution to the relations between the two separate states (Brendan O’Leary, 2006).
Critique
Critiques of partition come not only from academics, but also from politicians and international organizations. The most significant critiques, coming from states, argue that any partition violates both international law and the territorial integrity of national units. There is also the problem of population movement. When partition between two ethnic groups that are in conflict is conducted, there is hardly a case where all members of the two communities end up on their “own side” of the border. That creates the problem of finding a way out for those members of the communities in conflict who remain behind the border. Many partition theorists argue that “voluntary” population transfer should be conducted between conflict communities. Population transfer is a controversial subject that has been open to serious criticism for at least two reasons. First, even organized population transfers, if involuntary, are a violation of the fundamental human rights enshrined in international law. Second, there is debate about the degree to which any power can conduct “humane” population transfers. A cursory look at examples from the twentieth century reveals a chaotic and lethal record, primarily affecting civilians (Partitioning to Peace-Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars, in International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, by Carter Johnson, 2008).
This is important because successor states after partition will rarely be ethnically homogeneous and may incorporate new ethnic antagonisms. Moreover, partition does not resolve underlying ethnic rivalry, so civil wars that end in partition could be transformed into interstate wars between predecessor and successor states (Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature, in World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4, by Nicholas Sambanis, 2000).
Kosovo’s Partition
Drawing a line along the Ibar River in the north, and thus partitioning Kosovo in two parts, is not a new proposal. Not many people have made this proposal public, but behind the scenes of negotiations and media surveillance, many people have stated that partition could be a compromise solution only if it stroke a right balance between the two sides. Partition was first proposed by Dobrica Cosic, former Yugoslavian president and well-known Serbian writer. Even during Tito’s Yugoslavia, he argued that the national question of Kosovo had not been solved well enough and that partition could be a solution. Most recently in 2004, Cosic came out with a new book, Kosovo, where he described partition as a good solution, which would be based on territorial partition at the Ibar River, respect for the human rights of the minority communities on both sides of the border, i.e. Kosovar Serbs south of the line of the partition and Albanians living in Serbia, and extraterritoriality status of Serbian Orthodox Church monasteries (Kosovo, by Dobrica Cosic, 2004).
John Mearsheimer and Anatol Lieven both argued after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo that partition should be imposed. Mearsheimer argued in the realist tradition of incompatibility of functioning multiethnic states and European history, but also history of the region, i.e. more homogenous nation states would be more stable (The Case for Partitioning Kosovo, in Ted Galen Carpenter’s NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War, 2000, by John Mearsheimer, 1999). On the other hand, Lieven argued that good fences make good neighbors and that partition is the best way to end ethnic conflicts not just in Kosovo, but elsewhere (Divide and Survive, in Prospect, by Anatol Lieven, May 1999).
In Serbia, partition along ethnic lines was discussed more during Kosovo’s status negotiation process and prior to Kosovo’s proclamation of independence. Most authors propose partition along ethnic lines in the north based on the reality of the de facto separation but do not propose much institutional solution to the arrangement of possible remaining cleavages (Kosovo: Between Promised Independence and De Facto Partition, by Slavisa Orlovic, 2007; Serbia’s Exit Strategy for Kosovo, in Hereticus, by Slobodan Markovic, 2007; A Solution to Kosovo, in B92, by Dejan Jovic, 24 February 2009).
It is my argument that the permanent instability the unilateral proclamation of independence of Kosovo has generated could be solved by the partition of Kosovo along the ethnic lines in the north, in accordance with the principle of equal territorial loss, with reintegration of the north into Serbia. This should be a compromise between Serbs and Albanians, under the support of the international community. Proportionality of the rights of minority Serbs that remain below the partition line in Kosovo and minority Albanians living in the three Serbian municipalities bordering Kosovo, namely Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, should be offered as a solution that guarantees both the implementation of this compromise and the survival of the minorities without the conduction of population transfers.
Partition theorists usually argue that two methods for conducting partition exist: one holds that paternalism by great powers is necessary, the other implies that procedures matter, especially the involvement of the affected parties in the dispute in the agreement about the drawing of the border (Brendan O’Leary, 2006). Applying this to Kosovo’s case means that there is no solution that can be sustainable unless the great powers and the affected parties are on the same page. Therefore, for partition to happen, it is necessary that the proposal comes from the international community, the USA, the EU, and Russia. The experience in the Balkans shows that the political, diplomatic and military presence of the international community is indispensable to the process of ensuring security and stability. If all three great powers can agree on something, that solution is proven to be long lasting and relatively conflict solving, especially when it comes to former Yugoslavia conflicts. Compromise between Russia, the USA and the EU was struck both in the Dayton agreement and UNSC resolution 1244 that ended the Kosovo War. This deal, however, was not applicable to Kosovo’s final status. Therefore, we have seen that the unilateral proclamation of independence does not work as a stable solution. Russia’s cooperation would be essential to bring along Serbia to cooperate.
On the other hand, it is necessary that a compromise between the Kosovar and Serbian governments is reached on partition, to achieve as much reciprocal consent on the new border as possible. The agreement could be struck with the help of the great powers; there is critical public opinion in both communities that would accept this solution as just. Serbian President Boris Tadic has already stated that if all other possibilities failed, Serbia would consider partitioning Kosovo (Tadić Hints at Kosovo Partition, in B92, 30 September 2008). Public opinion polls that were conducted by the Serbian Ministry for Kosovo show that there is a majority in Serbia ready to accept the partition of Kosovo as a just solution. In two consecutive years, 2007 and 2008, these numbers varied from 51% to 56% (Kosovo and the Strategic Integration of Serbia, by the Government of Serbia, Ministry for Kosovo, 20 June 2008). Kosovo’s Albanian government would also be ready to accept this proposal, especially because they would not have to deal with the largest and most radical Serbs of the north when partition occurs. The Ahtisaari Plan is not functioning largely because Serbs in the north do not accept it while some Serbs in the enclaves and central Kosovo participate in Kosovo’s government. With the largest and most radicalized Serbian area (and the Serbs' only urban centre) no longer part of the state, the remaining Serbian minority would be spread out among isolated rural pockets that are more reconciled to living in an Albanian-majority state. For Albanians, that would make governance simpler -- not easy, just easier than the nearly impossible task set for them by the Ahtisaari Plan (Kosovo: The Day After, in Open Democracy, by Timothy Waters, 18 February 2008).
Such partition should be conducted under the principle of a relatively equal territorial loss. According to statistics, Serbia and Kosovo have a territory of 88,361 square km altogether, 10,887 square km out of which are represented by Kosovo. With the loss of Kosovo under the Ahtisaari Plan, Serbia lost 12% of its territory. The Serbs who represent a majority in the north, i.e. in four municipalities and the city of North Mitrovica, are living on a territory of 1,110 square km, which is around 10% of Kosovo’s original territory. Having this in mind, the relative loss is pretty much equal, approximately 10-11%. The importance of having a relatively equal territorial division in the Balkans could be seen in Bosnia, where the deal in Dayton could not have been struck without Serbs getting 49% of the territory, because no other percentage would have worked, even though some disputed territories were nothing but rocks and roadless areas (The Death of Yugoslavia -- Pax Americana -- Part 5, documentary by BBC).
The partition of Kosovo has to address another important point as well, and it is the protection of the rights of the minority communities that would stay behind, especially the Serbs remaining in the enclaves and the central part of independent Kosovo. Also, there has to be an agreement on the protection of the Serbian cultural heritage in Kosovo. It is my opinion that the Ahtisaari Plan makes compelling arguments which could be used for the negotiation of partition but only if they made rights reciprocal to the Albanians in the three municipalities in Serbia bordering Kosovo in order to have a good balance of minority rights protected. If there is no reciprocity in rights, the problem can be twofold. First, there would be a chance that the municipalities in Serbia with a significant Albanian population and total population of 54,000 (Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja) would claim that if North Kosovo had the right to partition, they also had right to become part of Kosovo, having in mind that they comprise an 80% majority in those municipalities and they are geographically leaning on the Kosovo border. Second, there would be a chance that the Serbian minority populations staying south of the partition border would leave Kosovo because they would feel both insecure in the new country and abandoned by the Serbian government. Therefore, it is necessary to tie the two problems together.
The Ahtisaari Plan provides for a good base for a compromise solution to this issue. The part of the Ahtisaari proposal on the protection of the rights of the communities and decentralization could be used as a solution to the implementation of reciprocal minority rights for both the Albanian community in Serbia and the remaining Serbian community in Kosovo. According to this proposal, members of the communities have both individual and collective rights to: express their culture identity and religion, receive public education in their own language, use their language and alphabet in relation to the municipal and government authority, use and display community symbols, have local names, street names and other topographical indications which reflect and are sensitive to the multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic character of the area at issue, have guaranteed rights to special representation in the public media, create and bolster the rise of their own media, etc. The proposal also provides for positive discrimination when it comes to participation in state institutions, the parliament and the government, but also municipalities and local councils, with certain reserved seats (Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, by Marti Ahtisaari, 27 March 2007).
Another, more important part that can be reciprocally implemented is the question of decentralization. The competences given to the municipalities with a majority population of a minority group are high according to the proposal. They consist of competences in higher/ university education and licensing educational institutions, secondary health care, responsibility in cultural affairs, including the protection and promotion of the religious and cultural heritage, and, especially importantly, enhanced participatory rights in the appointment of Police Station commanders, because the question of policing can be the hardest to solve in post-conflict areas. The Ahtisaari Proposal goes into much depth when it comes to the relation between the Serbian minority community and the government of Serbia that provides for special relations between Serbian majority municipalities and Serbia in the fields of education, cultural rights and transparent financing.
All these rights that are given to the Serbian minority community under the Ahtisaari Plan should be provided to the Albanian minority community in Serbia in order for partition to work. With the reciprocity of the rights of the minority groups in the two countries, the relations between the countries could be better in general as well. Most importantly, there would be no involuntary population transfers between communities because the solution should be based on compromise.
Conclusion
Using the theoretical justification of partition based on historicism in the Kosovo case is not hard. Partition is obviously the “last resort” case; its benefits outperform costs, and it is the solution for a “better tomorrow.”
The history of Kosovo shows that all possible solutions have been tried out except for de jure partition. Obviously, autonomy, unitarism and de facto separation have brought stability neither to Kosovo, nor to Serbia. There is not going to be any kind of reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia, as some Serbian politicians suggest, because Kosovo has passed through a certain time of independence, and that process is irreversible. At the same time, there is obviously not going to be any kind of integration of North Kosovo into Kosovo without spurring a major conflict.
The benefits of partition, however, are visible for both sides. For the Serbian government, partition could be seen as a matter of a face-saving mechanism because they could say that they had tried everything to preserve Kosovo as a whole, but even preserving the north was a victory. It is in Serbian foreign policy interest to find a way out of the problems created by Kosovo’s independence. Without finding a solution to the Kosovo problem, Serbia would be drifting further and further away from its foreign policy priority, namely the European Union integration. Because of the Kosovo question being unresolved, Serbia could also end up being isolated from all the countries which accept Kosovo’s independence, and we should especially bear in mind that those are the USA and major EU countries (A Solution to Kosovo, in B92, by Dejan Jovic, 24 February 2009). After one year of independence, it can be admitted that Serbia’s EU integration did not go as expected, and one of the reasons to blame is obviously the Kosovo problem.
For Kosovo, finding a deal with Serbia is even more important because Kosovo will not be recognized by many countries and members of major international institutions without a compromise solution with Serbia. This is especially important for the economic development of Kosovo, having in mind that it is the least developed country in southeastern Europe.
Partition benefits the international community as well because it can potentially resolve the current frozen conflict in Kosovo. There is nothing to lose in trying to impose a new agreement because all other proposals have failed.
The greatest cost could be a potential population movement, especially a movement of the Serbian communities from the enclaves and central Kosovo, but an agreement could hopefully prevent this from happening. It also has to be taken into consideration that there are Serbian politicians from central Kosovo and the enclaves who are already participating in the parliament and the central government of Kosovo, therefore making population movement less inevitable.
Partition would lead to a “better tomorrow.” Both Kosovo and Serbia have aspirations for joining the European Union. Historical examples have shown that membership in the EU tends to transform conflicts between previous antagonists, as in the case of Germany and France, for example. Similarly, the current integration process into the EU creates some kind of a rapprochement between Croatia and Serbia. Why that will not be the case between Serbia and Kosovo in the near future?
To conclude, partition is not perfect; it is painful and it carries risks, but the current situation is untenable. It is better to move the border than people to be trapped by it (A Separate Peace, in The New York Times, by Timothy Waters, 11 February 2007). Partition is certainly not a universal solution. But when everything else has failed, we need to have the courage to have responsibility for the solution (Divide and Survive, at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Anatol Lieven, May 1999).
Branislav Nešović
Branislav Nešović studies International Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, Serbia. For a year, he studied at the School of International Service at the American University in Washington D.C., USA, as part of the Forecast Exchange Program for Undergraduates. Branislav is interested in international relation theories and small state foreign policies. He is also a fan of music, literature and football.
